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Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment 
ADI AYAL* & URI BENOLIEL** 
One of the most vital debates in franchise law focuses on whether state or federal 
law should adopt “good-cause statutes” (GCSs), which require franchisors to show 
good cause before terminating contractual relations with a franchisee. The 
traditional law-and-economics analysis suggests that GCSs are inefficient. This 
inefficiency argument is based upon one central hypothesis: GCSs increase 
franchisee free riding since they limit the franchisor’s ability to terminate the 
franchise contract easily. The free-riding hypothesis has been significantly 
influential in the development of franchise law, as is evident in state and federal 
statutory regimes. To date, the majority of states and the federal government have 
refused to adopt GCSs. 
This Article investigates the free-riding hypothesis empirically and finds it 
wanting. Direct examination of consumer satisfaction in one of the industries most 
notoriously susceptible to free riding—hotels serving nonrepeat travelers—shows no 
significant differences between franchises subject to “at-will” laws and those subject 
to a GCS. We gathered a sample of 3442 franchised hotels, measured each one along 
several dimensions of quality, and assessed potential differences using multiple 
econometric methods. In none did the at-will states outperform the good-cause ones. 
Implications of our empirical results on the debate over GCSs are discussed in 
this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most vital debates in franchise law focuses on whether state or federal 
law should adopt good-cause statutes (GCSs) requiring franchisors to show good 
cause before terminating their contracts with franchisees.1 The traditional 
law-and-economics analysis suggests that GCSs are inefficient. This analysis derives 
from one central hypothesis: GCSs increase franchisee free riding by rendering it 
significantly more difficult for a franchisor to terminate the franchise contract, 
thereby impeding a central monitoring device used by franchisors.2 The logic of the 
traditional free-riding hypothesis is at first glance simple and commonsensical:3 
franchisees operate by selling products and services to consumers who rely on the 
franchise trademark as a telling brand. Customers purchase from the franchisee 
believing that the local venue is as good as any other franchised branch, essentially 
presuming they are interacting with the chain rather than the individual provider. 
Franchisees realize that much of their allure comes from national or regional 
campaigns rather than their own efforts, and thus they conserve their own funds and 
efforts by skimping where possible, that is, where the franchisor cannot catch them. 
A free-riding franchisee will thus cut corners in services and products, relying on the 
franchisor and other franchisees to uphold the brand reputation that brings customers 
through the door. According to the traditional free-riding hypothesis, industries that 
serve mostly nonrepeat customers, such as hotels and motels, are most prone to free 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. For articles expressing varying degrees of support for GCSs, see, e.g., Donald P. 
Horwitz & Walter M. Volpi, Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 54 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
217 (1980); Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling 
Franchisor: The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 139 
(2010); Tracey A. Nicastro, How the Cookie Crumbles: The Good Cause Requirement for 
Terminating a Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 785 (1994); Paul Steinberg & Gerald 
Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
105 (2004); Boyd Allan Byers, Note, Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise 
Terminations—A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. CORP. L. 607 (1994); David Hess, Note, 
The Iowa Franchise Act: Towards Protecting Reasonable Expectations of Franchisees and 
Franchisors, 80 IOWA L. REV. 333 (1995). For seminal articles expressing varying degrees of 
disagreement with GCSs, see James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach, 
The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1991); William 
L. Killion, The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced 
View of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 23 (2008); Jonathan 
Klick, Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of 
Franchise Termination, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 355 (2009); Bruce H. Kobayashi 
& Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT 325 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999); Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship 
Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 BUS. LAW. 289 (1989); see also Byron E. Fox & Henry 
C. Su, Franchise Regulation—Solutions in Search of Problems?, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
241 (1995); Mark Pruitt, Disclosure and Good Cause Legislation: “Where’s the Beef” in 
Franchise Regulation?, 90 COM. L.J. 563 (1985); David A. Eisenberg, Note, Balancing a 
Relationship—“Good Cause” Termination of Franchise Agreements in Michigan, 72 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 369 (1995). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See infra Part II.C. 
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riding. In such industries, free riding saves costs while reducing future sales only 
slightly and indirectly. At-will contracts then must be used by franchisors to keep 
franchisees in line. A “shape up or ship out” strategy works best when contracts can 
be terminated quickly and without recourse; thus, GCSs can get in the way. GCSs 
are therefore argued to increase franchisee free riding. 
This Article investigates the free-riding hypothesis empirically, by direct 
examination of consumer satisfaction in one of the industries most notoriously 
susceptible to free riding: hotels serving nonrepeat travelers. We gathered a sample 
of 3442 franchised hotels and measured each one along several dimensions of 
quality. We then used these measurements to compare the level of free riding by 
franchisees in states where GCSs apply with that of franchisees in at-will states. 
Perceived quality and customer satisfaction serve to proxy for franchisees’ 
investment of effort, as free riding typically results in customer complaints and 
lower-than-average ratings. Those franchisees who free ride on franchise reputation 
invest less in keeping their venues clean, their service prompt, and their customers 
happy. They rely on brand awareness and an ongoing stream of new customers lured 
by national advertising and chain-wide marketing. The results outlined below show 
no significant differences in free riding between franchise operations subject to the 
disparate legal regimes, thus casting considerable doubt on the validity of the 
traditional economic analysis of GCSs. 
This Article will proceed as follows: Parts I and II will provide context by 
reviewing the statutory framework and the theoretical context underlying the debate 
over the desirability of GCSs. Part III will present data and discuss the methodology 
for empirically testing the conventional economic hypothesis—namely, that GCSs 
reduce the ability of franchisor self-policing, thus increasing franchisee free riding. 
Part IV discusses normative implications and potential interpretations of the 
empirical results. 
I. GOOD-CAUSE STATUTES: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To date, only seventeen of the fifty states have adopted statutes requiring good 
cause as a condition for the termination of a franchise contract by a franchisor.4 
Under these statutes, good cause is commonly defined as a franchisee’s failure to 
adequately comply with the franchise agreement.5 A franchisor terminating the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. The seventeen good-cause states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-204(a)(1) (2011); 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(a) (West 
2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(a) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (West 2008); 815 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/19 (West 2008); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1(7) (2007); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 537A.10(7) (West Supp. 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(c) (West 2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14, subdiv. 3(b) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-404 
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-50-4 (2014); 
TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1503 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-564 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j) (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.03 (West 2009). 
 5. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-202(7)(A) (2011); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(a); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(H); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
1180 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1177 
 
contract without good cause is obligated, under the GCSs, to pay damages to the 
franchisee.6 Recoverable damages may include (1) a fraction of the franchisee’s 
tangible assets (both real and personal) used with respect to the terminated franchise, 
including sales outlets and facilities, offices, warehouses, trucks, furnishings, 
equipment, and accessories;7 (2) loss of goodwill;8 and (3) loss of profits.9 
GCSs are often explicitly mandatory, stating that any waiver of the statutory rights 
by a franchisee in any franchise contract shall be void.10 GCSs allegedly have two 
central purposes: first, to correct the perceived inequality in bargaining power 
between franchisors and franchisees;11 and, second, to protect franchisees against 
perceived franchisor opportunism.12 Without GCSs in place, franchisor opportunism 
                                                                                                                 
 
ANN. 705/19(b); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1(7); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537A.10(7); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS. ANN. § 445.1527(c); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14, subdiv. 3(b); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 87-402(8) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5; TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1502(4) 
(2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.02(4) (West 2009). 
For cases in which courts found statutory good cause lacking, see, e.g., Volvo Constr. Equip. 
N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2004); Kealey Pharmacy & Home 
Care Servs., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985); Atl. City Coin & Slot Serv. 
Co. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-208(b) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133g(a) (West 
2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(c) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-9(b) (West 2008); 
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/26 (West 2008); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-4 (2007); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 537A.10(13); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.17, subdivs. 1, 3 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 87-409 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-10 (West 2012); TENN. CODE 
ANN. 47-25-1509 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-571(a) (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.06(12) 
(West 2009). 
 7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(c)(1) (“[T]he numerator of the fraction shall consist of 
the franchised distributor’s gross sales (in the most recently completed fiscal year) within this 
State attributable to the terminated . . . franchise, and the denominator of the fraction shall 
consist of the franchised distributor’s total gross sales (in the most recently completed fiscal 
year) in this State . . . .”). 
 8. Tit. 6, § 2553(c)(2). 
 9. Tit. 6, § 2553(c)(3); see also ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS 
OF FRANCHISING 280 (2005); Roger D. Blair, Measuring Damages for Lost Profits in Franchise 
Termination Cases, 8 FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (1988); Joseph Schumacher & Kimberly Toomey, 
Recovering Lost Future Royalties in a Franchise Termination Case, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 116 (2001). 
 10. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20010 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 42-133f(f); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(e) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482E-6(2)(F); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 537A.10(4); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/41 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 80C.21 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.220(2) (West 2013); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 135.025(3) (West 2009). 
 11. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.025(2)(b); see also Lagarias & Boulter, supra note 
1, at 141; Dennis D. Palmer, Franchises: Statutory and Common Law Causes of Action in 
Missouri Revisited, 62 UMKC L. REV. 471, 491 (1994); Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 289; 
Christopher J. Curran, Note, Claims Against a Franchisor upon an Unreasonable Withholding 
of Consent to Franchise Transfer, 23 J. CORP. L. 135, 152 (1997). 
 12. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.025(2)(b); see also Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 F.3d 
1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1994); Bitronics Sales Co. v. Microsemiconductor Corp., 610 F. Supp. 
550, 556 (D. Minn. 1985); Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., No. CV 
96562061S, 1997 WL 297256, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 1997), aff’d, 736 A.2d 824 
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may take one of three central forms: (1) franchisors can force one-sided 
modifications of agreements on franchisees by threatening to terminate the franchise 
relationship at will;13 (2) franchisors may terminate the contract of an efficient 
franchisee who fully complies with the contract in order to sell the latter’s profitable 
unit to a new franchisee for higher franchise fees;14 and (3) the franchisor could 
terminate the contract of an efficient franchisee simply in order to manage the 
successful unit himself.15 
States that adopted GCSs vary significantly in population and location.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Good-cause states 
     At-will states 
Figure 1. Relative geographical heterogeneity of good-cause states 
                                                                                                                 
 
(Conn. 1999); Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728–29 (Iowa 
1995); McDonald’s Corp. v. Markim, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Neb. 1981); Kubis 
& Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 626 (N.J. 1996); David L. Cahn 
& Jeffrey S. Fabian, Mobility, the Home, and the Scope and Application of State Franchise 
Relationship and Termination Laws, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 107, 107 (2010); Robert W. Emerson 
& Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the Debate over Franchise 
Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (2012–2013); Palmer, supra note 11, at 491; 
Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 289; Curran, supra note 11, at 152. 
 13. See Munno v. Amoco Oil Co., 488 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (D. Conn. 1980); Michael J. 
Lockerby, Franchise Termination Restrictions: A Guide for Practitioners and Policy Makers, 
30 ANTITRUST BULL. 791, 833 (1985); Byers, supra note 1, at 621. 
 14. See Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div., 
462 A.2d 595, 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 271. 
 15. See BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 271; see also Lockerby, supra note 13, at 
834; Nicastro, supra note 1, at 801; Pruitt, supra note 1, at 565; Byers, supra note 1, at 621; 
Hess, supra note 1, at 334. 
 16. See James A. Brickley, Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence 
from Franchising, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 518 (2002). See supra note 4 for a list of the 
seventeen good-cause states. 
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The vast majority of GCSs were adopted in the 1970s.17 However, to this day 
most states do not have GCSs on their books. Since 1992, thirty states have 
considered enacting franchisee-protection laws, including GCSs, but the proposed 
laws have not passed.18 At the federal level, several GCSs have also been rejected.19 
For example, in 1998 and 1999, the federal government declined to enact several 
bills that would have made it unlawful for a franchisor to terminate a franchise 
agreement prior to its expiration without good cause.20 To date, no general federal 
law on franchise termination has been enacted. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GOOD-CAUSE STATUTES 
GCSs have been a source of intense debate and controversy among legal 
theoreticians.21 Given the centrality of law and economics in legal scholarship, it is not 
surprising that legal economists play a dominant role in this debate. The traditional 
analysis along these lines contends that GCSs are inefficient, relying on a three-step 
argument: First, franchisees are assumed to have an intrinsic incentive to free ride on 
the franchise chain’s reputation, squandering the goodwill enjoyed by franchisors as 
well as non-free-riding franchisees, thus reducing consumer welfare.22 Second, the 
franchisee’s incentive to free ride is argued to be minimized via an essential control 
mechanism: the ability of the franchisor to terminate any franchise contract at will.23 
Third, GCSs, which prevent franchisors from utilizing the indispensable at-will control 
mechanism, are understood to increase the level of franchisee free riding compared to 
an at-will regime.24 These three arguments will be presented in more detail below, in 
order to contextualize our critical and empirical analysis. 
A. Franchisees’ Inherent Incentive To Free Ride 
Individual franchisees at any franchise chain have a basic incentive to free ride on 
the efforts of franchisors as well as those of the other franchisees.25 In other words, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Thomas M. Pitegoff & W. Michael Garner, Franchise Relationship Laws, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 183, 185 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d 
ed. 2008). 
 18. Brickley, supra note 16, at 519. 
 19. See, e.g., Ernest A. Braun, Policy Issues of Franchising, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 155, 203–
04 (1984); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects 
When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 562–63 (1998); 
Horwitz & Volpi, supra note 1, at 218. 
 20. Small Business Franchise Act of 1999, H.R. 3308, 106th Cong. (1999); Small 
Business Franchise Act of 1998, H.R. 4841, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 21. See supra note 1. 
 22. See infra Part II.A.  
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (“Individual franchisees have the incentive to free 
ride on the trademark . . . .”); Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. 
CORP. FIN. 9, 12 (1995) (“One type of behavior that has been analyzed at great length is the 
free riding incentive created when franchisees jointly use a common brand name.”); Alan J. 
Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying 
2015] GOOD-CAUSE STATUTES REVISITED 1183 
 
franchisees are enticed to produce a product or service of substandard quality relative 
to that which would maximize joint profits for the entire franchise chain.26 Common 
claims are that franchisees seek to conserve funds by neglecting the appearance of 
their employees, skimping on workplace cleanliness, and overcharging customers.27 
The individual franchisee incentive, according to this view, is to “cheat” customers 
by providing them with low-quality products or services at the same price charged 
by other franchisees in the chain who maintain higher standards.28 
According to traditional economic analysis, the franchisee’s incentive to free ride 
derives from two central cumulative factors: On one hand, the individual franchisee 
fully internalizes the benefits of her free riding.29 On the other hand, the individual 
franchisee incurs only part of the reputational costs suffered by the franchise brand 
name due to her free-riding behavior.30 
                                                                                                                 
 
Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 118 (1996) (“Each franchisee will thus find it rational to 
engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of the franchise system—behavior that 
involves . . . ‘free riding’ . . . .”). 
 26. Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (“Individual franchisees have the incentive to . . . 
produce a below-standard-quality product . . . .”); Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider 
Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 736, 
746 (1984) (“All of the franchisees have a short-run incentive to produce a below-average 
product . . . .”); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual 
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 358 (1980) (“[T]here is an incentive for an individual 
opportunistic franchisee to cheat the franchisor by supplying a lower quality of product than 
contracted for.”); Byers, supra note 1, at 620–21 (“Free riding occurs when the franchisee 
reduces its costs by offering products and services below franchise quality standards . . . .”). 
 27. Roland E. Kidwell, Arne Nygaard & Ragnhild Silkoset, Antecedents and Effects of 
Free Riding in the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 22 J. BUS. VENTURING 522, 525 
(2007) (“Examples [of franchisee free riding] include failure to follow company procedures 
in terms of quality or service, overcharging customers, or lack of effort regarding appearance 
of employees or the workplace.”). 
 28. Meese, supra note 25, at 118 (“This free riding will consist of attempts to ‘cheat’ 
customers, by providing them with products inferior to those ordinarily associated with the 
trademark, presumably at the same price charged by those fellow franchisees who maintain a 
higher level of quality.”). 
 29. J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, The Foundations of Franchise Regulation: 
Issues and Evidence, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 157, 159 (1995) (“The lower-quality franchisee will 
benefit by the full amount of the savings from reducing quality . . . .”); Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise 
Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL. STUD. 549, 556 (2003) (“[T]he franchisee has an incentive to free ride 
on the brand’s capital, since he captures the full savings from reducing his effort level . . . .”); 
Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. 
& ECON. 223, 228 (1978) (“[I]f one franchisee allows the quality of his establishment to 
deteriorate, he benefits by the full amount of the savings from reduced quality 
maintenance . . . .”). 
 30. Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159 (“The lower-quality franchisee . . . will only 
lose part of the cost.”); Janet E. L. Bercovitz, The Organizational Choice Decision in Business 
Format Franchising: An Empirical Test, in ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF FRANCHISING 
NETWORKS 38, 44 (Josef Windsperger et al. eds., 2004) (“The outlet manager bears only a 
portion of the costs of such chiseling . . . .”); Goldberg, supra note 26, at 746 (“If a franchisee 
reduces the quality of the product sold, it bears only some of the costs . . . .”); Rubin, supra 
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In more detail, providing a lower-quality product or service allows the 
franchisee to cut her individual costs.31 Consequently, the free-riding franchisee 
can increase her individual profits.32 Since franchisees use a common brand as a 
trademark, a reduction in quality by one free-riding franchisee has the effect of 
reducing future demand facing all franchisees, not just that of the individual 
franchisee providing reduced quality.33 The free-riding franchisee is thus able to 
externalize a large portion of the reputational costs imposed on the franchise brand 
by her behavior.34 Furthermore, the benefits of free-riding behavior are immediate 
                                                                                                                 
 
note 29, at 228 (The free-riding franchisee “loses only part of the costs, for part is borne by 
other franchisees.”); Note, A Clarification and Reformulation of Prevailing Approaches to 
Product Separability in Franchise Tie-In Sales, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1165, 1174–75 (1983) (“The 
individual franchisee bears only a percentage of the cost of any consumer 
dissatisfaction . . . .”). 
 31. Bercovitz, supra note 30, at 44 (“[T]he outlet manager may free-ride on the system’s 
brand name and substitute cheaper, lower quality inputs in order to lower their store’s 
operating costs.”); James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach, An Agency 
Perspective on Franchising, 20 FIN. MGMT. 27, 29 (1991) (“[T]he cost savings from providing 
a lower quality product go directly to the given [free-riding] franchisee.”); Kidwell et al., supra 
note 27, at 525 (“A franchisee engaged in a contractual relationship with a franchisor might 
seek to lower his or her own costs by failing to participate in activities that would be 
collectively profitable for the overall franchise network.”); Klein, supra note 25, at 12 (“[E]ach 
franchisee can reduce its costs by reducing the quality of the product it supplies . . . .”); Note, 
supra note 30, at 1174 (“Individual franchisees, on the other hand, have an incentive to lower 
quality, which decreases the franchisee’s costs . . . .”). 
 32. Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 641 n.197 (1993) (“[A]ny one franchisee has a financial incentive to 
‘ride’ on the reputation being upheld by her fellow franchisees and to cut her own costs (and 
hence increase her profits) by offering a lower quality product or service to the consumer.”); 
Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy II, Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible 
Assets, 42 S. ECON. J. 572, 577 (1976) (“A franchisee who reduces the quality of the good or 
service he offers for a given price might increase his own profits . . . .”); Byers, supra note 1, 
at 620–21 (“Free riding occurs when the franchisee reduces its costs by offering products and 
services below franchise quality standards, thereby increasing its own profits . . . .”); 
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 372 (“The franchisee increases profits by cutting costs and offering 
lower quality products.”); Hess, supra note 1, at 343 n.74 (“Franchisees free-ride by providing 
a lower quality product to cut costs and receive higher profits . . . .”); Note, supra note 30, at 
1174 (“Individual franchisees . . . have an incentive to lower quality, which decreases the 
franchisee’s costs and increases the franchisee’s profit margin.”). 
 33. Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 349–50 (1985) (“The individual franchisee directly benefits 
from the sales of the lower-quality product, and the other franchisees share in the losses caused 
by decreased future demand.”); Rubin, supra note 29, at 228 (“All franchisees would lose 
something as a result of this deterioration in one franchise: consumers would have less faith 
in the quality promised by the trademark.”). 
 34. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 950 n.88 (“[F]ree-riding is an example of an 
economic externality.”); Rubin, supra note 29, at 228 (“What is involved is a classic 
externality problem.”); see also Goldberg, supra note 26, at 746. 
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and obvious, while costs are both dispersed along the network and delayed to an 
uncertain future. 
Ultimately, the free-riding franchisee harms not only the franchisor and 
non-free-riding franchisees but also consumers and aggregate efficiency.35 
Consumers are normally unaware ex ante of free riding by individual franchisees or 
of quality distinctions between stores belonging to the same chain and bearing a 
common trademark.36 This problem is exacerbated when marketing is conducted 
centrally by the franchisor, through national or regional advertising, online 
reservation systems, and the like.  Consumers therefore bear the cost of free riding, 
“overpaying for a product of less than anticipated quality.”37 In the long run, free 
riding reduces demand and deteriorates brand reputation—costs dispersed among all 
those participating in franchise profits. 
The traditional economic literature on franchisee free riding distinguishes 
between two basic scenarios: high probability of repeat purchase by particular 
customers versus low probability of the same.38 According to this distinction, the 
franchisee’s incentive to free ride is lower where the probability of repeat customers 
is high, as customers experiencing subpar performance will refrain from future 
business at the same location.39 Repeat business to an individual franchisee unit thus 
serves as a constraining factor on free riding, since the franchisee will bear the costs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159 (“These lower quality franchisees benefit 
at the expense of the franchisor, higher-quality franchisees, and consumers.”). 
 36. Klein & Saft, supra note 33, at 351. 
 37. Id.; see also Burns, supra note 32, at 641 n.197 (“Such free riding . . . harms the 
consumer who receives a lower quality good although paying full price . . . .”). 
 38. See Rajiv P. Dant & Nada I. Nasr, Control Techniques and Upward Flow of 
Information in Franchising in Distant Markets: Conceptualization and Preliminary Evidence, 
13 J. BUS. VENTURING 3, 11 (1998) (“[Franchising r]esearchers classify businesses into repeat 
versus nonrepeat industries. Although this repeat/nonrepeat dichotomy oversimplifies 
consumer purchasing behavior, it is still useful in studying agency relationships in the context 
of franchising as it highlights the differences in the consequences of shirking for the 
franchisee.” (citation omitted)). 
 39. See Robert Dahlstrom & Arne Nygaard, A Preliminary Investigation of Franchised 
Oil Distribution in Norway, 70 J. RETAILING 179, 184 (1994) (“In repeat selling situations the 
owner of a specific outlet is interested in maintaining quality.”); Dant & Nasr, supra note 38, 
at 12 (“[I]n repeat purchase industries, there are fewer opportunities for reputational abuse and 
a lesser incidence of the free-rider problem by the franchisees . . . .”); Lorelle Frazer & Donald 
J. Stokes, Franchising Operational Units in Australia, 2 FRANCHISING RES. 32, 34 (1997) 
(“The propensity for free-riding to occur is lower where repeat customers form a large part of 
an outlet’s sales.”); Kidwell et al., supra note 27, at 531 (“[R]epeated business establishes a 
relationship between customer and operator that potentially lowers the likelihood of free 
riding; it would be rational to decrease free riding on a brand name when there is a greater 
chance that customers would offer repeat business.”); Klein & Saft, supra note 33, at 348 n.15 
(“The creation of ‘neighborhood stores’ increased the repeat purchase probability and hence 
reduced the incentive of individual franchisees to free ride on the group.”); Kobayashi 
& Ribstein, supra note 1, at 340 (“Operators who rely on local repeat business are less able to 
free-ride off the franchisor’s brand name . . . .”); Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 
18 J. CORP. L. 245, 275 (“Operators who rely on local repeat business are less able to free ride 
off the franchiser’s brand-name . . . .”). 
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of her own shirking.40 Industries that are particularly likely to attract repeat 
customers, and are therefore less prone to free riding, include those that serve local 
populations, such as lawn care, laundry and dry cleaning, automotive services, health 
and fitness centers, and homecare.41 
Conversely, a franchisee’s incentive to free ride is particularly great where the 
probability of repeat purchase by a particular customer is very low.42 In such cases, 
the probability that a franchise will suffer the costs of losing customers already 
unlikely to return renders free riding rational: decreasing effort levels and reducing 
both monetary and personal investment in quality then becomes profitable.43 The risk 
of losing customers in these situations is borne by the entirety of the franchise chain, 
affecting the free-riding franchise only marginally.44 This is because the dissatisfied 
customer is likely to refrain from future business with any branch within the franchise 
chain where subpar performance was experienced. The local franchisee who caused 
the initial dismay loses little, as in any case repeat business by the same customer 
was unlikely. Overall, though, this scenario has each local venue externalizing the 
costs of dissatisfied customers onto other branches within the same chain, potentially 
creating a sizable overall effect. 
According to the traditional law-and-economics perspective, industries that serve 
mostly nonrepeat customers are therefore much more prone to free riding.45 This is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 29, at 557; see also ELIZABETH CRAWFORD SPENCER, 
THE REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 69 (2010) (“In the case of 
a particular franchise unit, when repeat customers accrue to the benefit of that particular 
franchisee . . . there are positive incentives for that franchisee to cultivate his customers.”); 
Frazer & Stokes, supra note 39, at 34. 
 41. See James A. Brickley, Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from 
Franchising, 42 J.L. & ECON. 745, 755 (1999); James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The 
Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 416 (1987); 
see also Dant & Nasr, supra note 38, at 11 (“Franchise outlets in repeat customer industries 
are likely to cater to largely local populations; such industries may include sports equipment, 
department, and clothing stores.” (citation omitted)). 
 42. Brickley et al., supra note 31, at 29 (“The incentives to free-ride are particularly high 
at units where the level of repeat customers is low.”); Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 
(“[T]he incentives to shirk on quality are highest in units where the level of repeat customers 
is low . . . .”); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 
OF PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 16 (2006) (“Free-riding is a particular problem when a franchisee 
serves mainly nonrepeat customers . . . .”); Mick Carney & Eric Gedajlovic, Vertical 
Integration in Franchise Systems: Agency Theory and Resource Explanations, 12 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 607, 610 (1991) (“The danger of free riding is greatest where repeat customers 
constitute a small proportion of unit sales . . . .”); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract 
Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 951 
n.224 (1994) (“Free-riding is potentially most severe at locations . . . where the probability of 
repeat sales to that same customer is quite low.”); Klein, supra note 26, at 359 n.2; Hess, supra 
note 1, at 343 n.74 (“A franchisee at a location with low probability of repeat sales to the same 
customer has the greatest incentive to free-ride.”). 
 43. See Kidwell et al., supra note 27, at 531. 
 44. Frazer & Stokes, supra note 39, at 34. 
 45. See Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (“[T]he incentives to shirk on quality are 
highest in units where the level of repeat customers is low . . . .”); Brickley et al., supra note 
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especially relevant in industries serving travelers, such as hotels, motels, and 
car-rental agencies.46 Although there is potential for some repeat sales within the 
same location in these industries, the likelihood of such sales is relatively low.47 For 
example, although some travelers visit the same cities frequently and stay repeatedly 
at favorite hotels, many others pass through a city only once and must stay at an 
unfamiliar hotel.48 In many cases, therefore, “the hotel owner has little incentive to 
please a one-time visitor.”49 The one-time visitor does not present the potential of 
future business.50 Once the traveler has decided to stay at the hotel, there is little 
recourse if, for example, the room is unclean or the service slow.51 The guest will 
leave unsatisfied, but since there was little chance of the guest returning anyway, no 
significant harm has occurred from the perspective of the hotel.52 
B. At-Will Termination as an Essential Control Mechanism Against Free Riding 
According to the conventional law-and-economics analysis, an essential mechanism 
for reducing franchisee free riding is the ability of the franchisor to terminate the 
franchise contract at will, namely without having to prove before a disinterested third 
party that good cause for termination exists.53 As the late Larry Ribstein proffered: 
                                                                                                                 
 
31, at 29 (“The incentives to free-ride are particularly high at units where the level of repeat 
customers is low.”). 
 46. Dant & Nasr, supra note 38, at 11–12 (“Nonrepeat purchase industries are those where 
customers are generally mobile and less prone to repeat purchasing from the same outlet (at 
least in the short-run) even though they may patronize the same franchise system; restaurants, 
hotels, motels, and auto rental service franchises, in general, are considered examples of such 
industries.”); see also Brickley, supra note 41, at 755 n.20; Brickley & Dark, supra note 41, 
at 416; Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 121; Chris Manolis, Robert Dahlstrom & Arne Nygaard, 
A Preliminary Investigation of Ownership Conversions in Franchised Distribution Systems, 
11 J. APPLIED BUS. RES., no. 2, 1995, at 4. 
 47. Manolis et al., supra note 46, at 4. 
 48. Paul Ingram, Organizational Form as a Solution to the Problem of Credible 
Commitment: The Evolution of Naming Strategies Among U.S. Hotel Chains, 1896–1980, 17 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 85, 86 (1996). 
 49. Id. at 86–87. 
 50. Id. at 87. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.; see also You-Ta Chuang & Joel C. Baum, It’s All in the Name: Failure-Induced 
Learning by Multiunit Chains, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 33, 36 (2003) (“[B]ecause travelers are 
unlikely to return to the same hotel repeatedly and are unable to gauge its service quality 
without prior experience, hotels have no incentive to provide good service in order to attract 
future business.”). 
 53. Erin Ann O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the Potential Conflict of Laws, 90 
GEO. L.J. 941, 945 (2002) (The ability of the franchisor to terminate the contract at will is 
“necessary to prevent individual franchisees from free-riding off the value of the trademark. 
. . . The only way to ensure that [the franchisee] complies with her obligations is to enable the 
franchisor to threaten immediate termination.”); see also Rubin, supra note 29, at 228 (“The 
franchisor wants to eliminate any operations not maintaining the quality of the franchise. 
Contracts calling for easy termination of franchises make it possible to avoid the period of 
quality deterioration.”); Martin Edward Loeber, Comment, A DTPA Cause of Action for the 
Terminated or Nonrenewed Franchisee: A Jack in the Box for the Unfair Franchisor, 43 
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“Termination at will can be an important right for franchisers, since it may be the only 
way they can effectively monitor their franchisees to prevent franchisees from 
free-riding on and decreasing the value of the franchiser’s brand name.”54 
The conventional assumption that at-will termination is an essential control 
mechanism against franchisee free riding is based on the following analysis: when a 
franchisor has the ability to terminate a contract at will, the franchisee will know that 
detection of free riding results in swift termination and loss of lucrative business 
opportunities within the chain.55 Furthermore, termination induces direct costs, such 
as the loss of relationship-specific investments.56 
Relationship-specific investments, also known as idiosyncratic investments, are 
investments specific to a concrete franchise relationship.57 They are highly 
specialized and tailored to that franchise relationship58 and, as such, are difficult or 
impossible to redeploy elsewhere.59 Such costs are therefore sunk, having little or no 
salvage value to the franchisee after contract termination.60 Relationship-specific 
                                                                                                                 
 
BAYLOR L. REV. 809, 816 (1991) (“[E]conomists argue that broad termination clauses are 
necessary for the franchisors to protect the franchise from the inherent tendency of franchisees 
to undermine the value of the trademark.”). Similarly, franchisors, and not only legal 
economists, argue that the threat of at-will termination is the only means by which they can 
protect themselves from free-riding franchisees. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 372 
(“Franchisors argue that the threat of arbitrary termination is the only means by which they can 
protect themselves from franchisees engaging in potentially opprobrious behavior.”); Hess, supra 
note 1, at 342 (“Franchisors claim a need for an unrestricted termination power to protect the 
value of their trademark and to insure a uniform standard of quality among all franchises.”). 
 54. Ribstein, supra note 39, at 248 (emphasis added). 
 55. See Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 160 (“[T]he existence of the clause that has 
caused so much trouble and given rise to so much sympathy for franchisees—the franchisor’s 
right to terminate ‘at will’—becomes understandable. When such clauses are enforced, the 
franchisee would know that detection results in swift termination. The clause is thus a 
lower-cost method than litigation of reducing the franchisee incentive to cheat.”); see also 
Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104 (The franchisee’s incentive to free ride “will be lower if 
franchisees who are caught cheating are punished by contract termination and thus lose any 
remaining quasi rents on firm-specific investments.”); Byers, supra note 1, at 657 (“The 
franchisor’s termination power is therefore essential—as both a threat to encourage franchisee 
compliance and a means to actually purge noncomplying franchisees from the system—to 
ensure that goods and services of requisite quality are supplied to consumers.”). 
 56. The following explanation is based on Uri Benoliel, Rethinking the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Abandonment Requirement in Mac’s Shell Service Inc. v. Shell Oil Products, 43 
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 83–87 (2011). 
 57. Erin Anderson & Barton Weitz, The Use of Pledges To Build and Sustain Commitment 
in Distribution Channels, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 18, 20 (1992). 
 58. Shankar Ganesan, Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller 
Relationships, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1994, at 1, 6; Jan B. Heide & George John, The Role of 
Dependence Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional 
Channels, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1988, at 20, 21 n.1. 
 59. Anderson & Weitz, supra note 57, at 20; Heide & John, supra note 58, at 21 n.1. 
 60. See James R. Brown, Jody L. Crosno & Chekitan S. Dev, The Effects of 
Transaction-Specific Investments in Marketing Channels: The Moderating Role of Relational 
Norms, 17 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 317, 317 (2009) (“[T]ransaction-specific 
investments . . . have little or no value outside of that relationship.” (emphasis in original)); 
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investments include “leasehold improvements,” fixtures that are attached to the retail 
or commercial space and installed by the franchisee when setting up a new location, 
such as walls, doors, cabinets, light fixtures, and floor coverings.61 Such 
improvements may be significant and costly: for example, a Subway franchisee may 
be required to invest up to $134,500 in leasehold improvements.62 The costs involved 
are typically sunk, as franchisors often require the franchisee to lease, rather than own, 
the land upon which the outlet is located.63 The lease arrangement grants the franchisor 
the right to require the franchisee to evacuate the leased property upon termination of 
the franchise contract.64 As a result, the leasehold improvements, which remain the 
property of the franchisor, must be surrendered by the franchisee along with the 
property, causing the free-riding franchisee substantial economic loss.65 
Equipment expenditures are another form of relationship-specific investments 
lost by a free-riding franchisee if the franchise agreement is terminated at will by a 
franchisor.66 Depending upon the conditions of the space and the particular business 
model, the required equipment expenditures can be extensive: for example, a 
McDonald’s franchisee may be required to invest more than $1.5 million dollars in 
equipment, including signs, seating, and décor.67 Frequently, much of the equipment 
purchased cannot be used outside the franchise, thus making the expenditure 
relationship specific.68 Obviously, the fast-food franchisee’s outdoor signs cannot be 
used by the franchisee with any other franchisor.69 Similarly, franchise-specific décor 
                                                                                                                 
 
Ganesan, supra note 58, at 6 (“Transaction-specific assets are investments in durable assets 
that are . . . not easily redeployable and have little salvage value in other relationships.”); Jan 
B. Heide & George John, Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint Action 
in Buyer-Supplier Relationships, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 24, 27 (1990) (“Specific investments 
are investments made by a firm that are of considerably less value outside the focal 
relationship.”). 
 61. See Franchise Tutorial 20: Intro to Leasehold Improvements, CANADIAN FRANCHISE 
ASS’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20140327184418/http:/cfa.ca/Publications_Research/Tutorials
/tutorial20.aspx. 
 62. See Subway Franchise Cost & Fees, FRANCHISE DIRECT, http://www.franchisedirect.com
/directory/subway/ufoc/915/ (last updated 2014). 
 63. See ANNE T. COUGHLAN, ERIN ANDERSON, LOUIS W. STERN & ADEL I. EL-ANSARY, 
MARKETING CHANNELS 539 (7th ed. 2006); Klein, supra note 26, at 359. 
 64. See Klein, supra note 26, at 359. 
 65. Antony W. Dnes, ‘Unfair’ Contractual Practices and Hostages in Franchise 
Contracts, 148 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 484, 487 (1992) (“Tenants normally make 
alterations to commercial premises (leasehold improvements) which must be given up with 
the property. If the franchisor fails to renew the lease the franchisee cannot adapt 
improvements to other uses.”). Of course, the sunk nature of these costs, together with the 
direct benefit franchisors accumulate from repossessing the improved property, are major 
causes of concern for franchisees, as they point to potential franchisor opportunism. 
 66. Benoliel, supra note 56, 85–86. 
 67. See McDonald’s Franchise Cost & Fees, FRANCHISE DIRECT, http://
www.franchisedirect.com/foodfranchises/mcdonalds-franchise-07030/ufoc/ (last updated 2014). 
 68. Dnes, supra note 65, at 502. 
 69.  Brown et al., supra note 60, at 317. 
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is regarded as worthless outside the franchise’s chain.70 But beyond these 
expenditures, many franchises operate with idiosyncratic procedures, necessitating 
specialized equipment and investments well beyond those observable by customers; 
as a result, contract termination typically necessitates resale of franchisee equipment 
at a substantial loss.71 
C. Good-Cause Statutes as Increasing Franchisee Free Riding 
According to the conventional law-and-economics analysis, good-cause statutes 
disrupt the essential control mechanism against franchisee free riding: at-will 
termination.72 GCSs increase the costs of terminating a franchise contract, as 
compared to an at-will regime, for four cumulative reasons. 
First, GCSs generate documentation costs for a franchisor who wishes to 
terminate a contract.73 The GCSs place the burden on the franchisor to prove that 
there was good cause for terminating the contract.74 These statutes require increased 
payments to a franchisee in the case of termination unless good cause can be 
documented by the franchisor in a court proceeding, which naturally bears high 
additional costs.75 Even clear cases of cause-based termination will thus be subject 
to burdens of proof, leading to an ex-ante policy of procedures and complaints, and 
early monitoring will be carefully documented.76 Documentation costs thus plague 
franchise relationships even where no free riding occurs, as the necessary protocols 
must be in place and documentation gathered throughout the life of the contract, 
regardless of eventual use. 
Second, GCSs generate significant litigation costs: by granting franchisees 
protection from arbitrary termination, GCSs invite every terminated franchisee to 
litigate the issue of whether or not good cause existed.77 Such litigation is costly, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Cf. Dnes, supra note 65, at 489–91. The secondhand value of trademarked franchise 
equipment is normally one quarter of its original cost. See COUGHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 537. 
 71. Cf. COUGHLAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 537; Dnes, supra note 65, at 495; Warren S. 
Grimes, Making Sense of State Oil Co. v. Khan: Vertical Maximum Price Fixing Under a Rule 
of Reason, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 567, 586 (1998); Warren S. Grimes, Market Definition in 
Franchise Antitrust Claims: Relational Market Power and the Franchisor’s Conflict of 
Interest, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 243, 250–51 (1999). 
 72. Cf. Klein, supra note 25, at 30 (GCSs “entail the associated cost of making the 
self-enforcement mechanism more difficult to use.”); Pruitt, supra note 1, at 569 (“By 
disrupting the essential control component of franchise contracts, relationship statutes 
[namely, GCSs] undermine the very benefits to be achieved through the franchising method 
of distribution.”); Ribstein, supra note 39, at 275 (“Consider the example of a statute that 
limits termination-at-will of franchisees . . . . Limitations on termination reduce the 
franchiser’s ability to discipline shirking or free-riding franchisees.”); Byers, supra note 1, at 
657 (“Good cause limitations on termination are the primary manner in which lawmakers have 
attempted to protect the franchisee’s nonrecoverable investment. However, such laws can 
hinder the franchisor’s ability to effectively police its franchise system.”). 
 73. See Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 310 n.88. 
 74. Id. at 309–10. 
 75. Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 104. 
 76. See Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 310 n.88. 
 77. Pruitt, supra note 1, at 569. 
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both directly (court/attorney fees and the like) and indirectly (diverting attention 
from business concerns to legal ones, tarnishing franchise reputation, and more).78 
Litigation costs obviously limit the franchisor’s incentive to instigate proceedings, 
making a threat to sue less credible and its use in preventing free riding ex ante less 
effective. Of course, litigation costs might also lead to pretrial negotiations and 
suboptimal settlements, making even those franchisees whose contracts are 
terminated less worried about such a result. 
Third, GCSs expose franchisors who terminate a free-riding franchisee for good 
cause to costs stemming from errors. Namely, franchisors are required to bear the risk 
of erroneous court decisions.79 A franchisor must not only convince itself that 
termination was based on good cause;80 in order to prevail in litigation, it must also 
convince external observers of the existence of good cause. Since legal results are 
typically uncertain, courts may wrongfully decide that termination was arbitrary and 
unlawful even when good cause existed. Given that GCSs shift the burden of proof and 
make the franchisor’s case harder to win, error costs are borne mostly by the plaintiff, 
further reducing the incentive to exercise the contractual threat of termination. 
Last, GCSs expose the franchisor to the risk of a biased jury. More specifically, 
when a franchisee can request a jury trial, the franchisor faces the additional obstacle 
of juror bias, as jurors may favor the “little” franchisee over the “bigger” franchisor 
and the local owner over the national chain.81 These costs and risks are reduced, if 
not eliminated, if termination can be conducted at will.82 
Law-and-economics scholars argue that, by disrupting the essential at-will control 
mechanism, GCSs increase free riding in franchise relationships.83 As Professors 
Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein straightforwardly claimed, “franchisee 
protection laws increase shirking and free-riding.”84 Similarly, Professor Jonathan 
Klick joined Kobayashi and Ribstein when he argued that the benefits of GCSs “may 
be outweighed by their costs in preventing franchisors from disciplining shirking 
franchisees.”85 Likewise, Professor Erin Ann O’Hara assumed that GCSs “transfer 
wealth from franchisor to franchisee because they enable individual franchisees some 
latitude to free ride off the company trademark and thereby earn greater profits.”86 
Similarly, Professor Matthew Ellman implies that under the governance of GCSs, 
“the free-riding problem is very hard to solve.”87 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. See Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159. 
 79. Pitegoff, supra note 1, at 310 n.88. 
 80. Beales & Muris, supra note 29, at 159. 
 81. Id. at 159–60. 
 82. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 
314 (1975). 
 83. See Matthew Ellman, Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments, 22 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 234, 250 n.36 (2005); Klick et al., supra note 1, at 364; Kobayashi & Ribstein, 
supra note 1, at 340; O’Hara, supra note 53, at 946. 
 84. Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 1, at 340. 
 85. Klick et al., supra note 1, at 364 (emphasis added). 
 86. O’Hara, supra note 53, at 946. 
 87. Ellman, supra note 83, at 250 n.36; see also Byers, supra note 1, at 657 (GCSs “can 
hinder the franchisor’s ability to effectively police its franchise system.”). 
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Given that prevailing wisdom is aligned with economic principles and paints a 
black picture of GCSs, we decided to empirically assess whether common sense is 
indeed based on fact and whether at-will termination is as important as many would 
have us believe. 
III. TESTING PREVAILING WISDOM: DO GCSS INCREASE FREE RIDING? 
The scant existing empirical literature assessing the influence of GCSs on 
franchisee free riding focuses on indirect indicators, such as the number of local 
businesses within a given industry owned by franchisors versus franchisees or the 
level of employment in franchise-intensive industries.88 These indicators are used 
as proxies for the quality of franchise operations, with commentators attempting to 
disentangle franchisee free riding from franchisor opportunism.89 In order to avoid 
the pitfalls of indirect inference, we sought a database that would provide for more 
direct evidence of free riding, ideally one that rates franchise operations on an 
individual basis (rather than cumulative results for the entire state or industry). 
Such data could then be examined for direct evidence of quality differences 
between otherwise-similar franchise operations in states where GCSs were 
enacted versus states where at-will termination is possible at the franchisors’ 
discretion. If the standardly accepted free-riding hypothesis is valid, we should 
observe—in each typical franchise chain—the following phenomenon: the 
average level of free riding of all the franchisee units located in good-cause states 
should be higher than the average level of free riding among all of the franchisee 
units located in at-will states. 
With this in mind, we decided to examine, as a case study, the level of free riding 
among franchisees in the hotel industry. Free riding is obviously impossible to assess 
directly, as it takes many forms. We thus focused on its output: effects on customer 
satisfaction and assessments of service and cleanliness. These are the results of effort 
and care on the part of the service provider, with lower investment in quality assumed 
to result in lower service and satisfaction. We chose the hotel industry as our case 
study because, according to the traditional law-and-economics approach, it is 
particularly prone to a high risk of franchisee free riding.90 Since the hotel industry 
generally serves travelers who are nonrepeat customers, hotel franchisees do not 
internalize the full costs of their free riding.91 We would thus expect free riding to be 
prevalent, and where it is left unchecked, the investment in quality (and thus 
customer satisfaction) should be low. 
A. Methodology 
In order to locate suitable candidates for comparison, we selected franchise 
chains according to several criteria. We sought national chains with multiple 
locations in each state and a sizable presence in both good-cause and at-will states. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. See Brickley et al., supra note 1; Klick et al., supra note 1. 
 89. See Brickley et al., supra note 1, at 130; Klick et al., supra note 1, at 375. 
 90. See supra notes 45–46. 
 91. See supra Part II.A. 
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This approach allowed for a sample size that reduced the effects of random 
variation across sites and states. We focused on chains that serve many travelers 
unlikely to return to the same location and that rely to a great degree on investment 
in quality that is difficult to quantify (e.g., effort, employee supervision, 
investment in service and quality). Thus, we focused on customer assessment of 
service and cleanliness (which serve as proxies for investment of effort) and total 
satisfaction (which captures multiple dimensions of quality). Free-riding 
franchisees would be expected to achieve lower satisfaction ratings by customers 
expecting certain standards that were not met. Last, we screened for franchises that 
operate exclusively as franchisee-owned-and-operated businesses, in order to 
avoid complications arising from including company-owned sites less prone to the 
type of free riding we set out to examine. It should be noted that all conditions were 
set to make free riding easier to discern using publicly available data. Thus, if the 
prevailing wisdom regarding GCSs is correct, our test should pick up any 
differences between states with and without such statutes. 
In order to find suitable candidates, we used the well-known website 
Entrepreneur.com to generate a list of ten chains meeting our initial criteria.92 From 
this list, we decided to focus on the larger chains for sample-size purposes, and we 
set our lower threshold to admit only those chains having more than four hundred 
U.S. hotels. Where hotel chains featured different quality tiers (such as discount 
hotels, suites, and luxury hotels), we assessed each tier as a separate chain to avoid 
quality-specific attributes being lost and to screen for free riding in disparate 
circumstances. 
Screening for franchisee-owned hotel chains, operating nationally and consisting 
of more than four hundred franchised hotels, led to a sample totaling some 3700 
hotels across three relevant chains: Days Inn,93 Ramada,94 and Super 8.95 If the 
free-riding hypothesis is valid, we should observe—in each of these three sample 
chains—the following phenomena: The average level of free riding of all the 
franchisee units located in good-cause states should be higher than the average level 
of free riding of all the franchisee units located in at-will states. This should lead to 
higher customer ratings for hotels located in at-will states compared to good-cause 
hotels from within the same chain and quality tier. 
In order to ascertain the average level of free riding among the franchises 
subject to different laws, we took the following three steps for each of the three 
selected chains across all states: First, we located—via an online hotel search 
engine called freehotelsearch.com—all the hotels situated in good-cause states 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. These chains were Baymont Inn & Suites; Centerstone Inns, Hotels & Plaza Hotels; 
Days Inn; Hospitality Int’l Inc.; Knights Inn; Microtel Inn & Suites by Wyndham; Ramada; 
Super 8; Travelodge; and Wingate by Wyndham. 
 93. Days Inn has 1552 units in the United States. Days Inn, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/daysinn/282270-0.html. 
 94. Ramada has 416 units in the United States. Ramada, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/ramada/282743-0.html. 
 95. Super 8 has 1696 units in the United States. Super 8, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/super8/282845-0.html. 
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belonging to the chains in question.96 Second, for each hotel, we searched 
Expedia.com for customer ratings left by actual guests regarding service, 
cleanliness, and total satisfaction. These criteria were rated by hotel guests on a 
scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least favorable and 5 being the most favorable. 
The guest ratings for these criteria serve, in our study, as a proxy for the 
franchisee’s level of free riding. Free-riding hotels typically receive low ratings by 
guests under the service, cleanliness, and total satisfaction criteria, as these 
qualities are difficult to specify in contractual terms, making cost-reducing 
shirking by franchisees more prevalent. Conversely, non-free-riding hotels will 
normally receive higher ratings. Third, we calculated average ratings in each 
criterion and compared across states, contrasting good-cause with at-will states. 
It should be noted that we selected Expedia.com as our database for guest 
ratings because of its inherent protection from manipulation by self-interested 
parties. The common fear with all rating systems is that participants will attempt 
to “game the system” in order to bolster their reputation and attract potential 
clients. With online ratings, there is always a risk of business owners inserting 
positive ratings and false recommendations for their own facilities and negative 
ratings for their competitors. On Expedia.com, only those who actually booked a 
hotel through the site, paid for it, and had their stay verified can enter a review.97 
The sheer financial cost of a franchisee posting a falsified review on Expedia.com 
is prohibitive, thus bestowing credibility on those reviews found online.98 
Furthermore, booking a hotel night through Expedia requires the reviewer to 
undertake a credit card transaction on Expedia.com. The reviewer, therefore, does 
not remain anonymous to Expedia, raising the probability that the company will 
detect phony reviews. Ultimately, detection can prove costly for a forging 
franchisee, as it may lead to government fines, private lawsuits, penalties imposed 
by the review-hosting platform, and associated reputational costs.99 Given that such 
significant costs may spill over, at least in part, to franchisors, many of them 
contractually constrain the social-media practices of franchisees, thereby 
increasing the franchisees’ forging costs.100 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. This website allows searching for Days Inn, Ramada, and Super 8 hotels within the 
boundaries of each U.S. state. See, e.g., Days Inn Hotels in U.S.A., FREEHOTELSEARCH.COM, 
http://www.freehotelsearch.com/U_S_A-Days_Inn-chain.html. 
 97. Press Release, Expedia, Inc., Expedia Overhauls Hotel Reviews: Consumers Can 
Now Sort Verified Reviews by Shared Interest (Mar. 8, 2012), available at http://
mediaroom.expedia.com/travel-news/expedia-overhauls-hotel-reviews-consumers-can-now
-sort-verified-reviews-shared-interest-; Danny King, Expedia Touts ‘Verified’ Reviews, 
TRAVEL WEEKLY (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.travelweekly.com/travel-news/online-travel
/expedia-touts--verified--hotel-reviews. 
 98. The same is not true for other common review sites, such as TripAdvisor, where the 
same (nonpaying) individual can post multiple reviews. See Dina Mayzlin, Yaniv Dover 
& Judith A. Chevalier, Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review 
Manipulation 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18340, 2012), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18340.pdf. 
 99. Id. at 14. 
 100. See id. at 15. 
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After separately measuring—via Expedia.com—customer perceptions of 
cleanliness, service quality, and overall satisfaction for each of the three selected 
chains in both the good-cause states and the at-will states, we tested the 
free-riding hypothesis for each chain and quality tier: namely, whether ratings 
for franchisee units located in good-cause states are indeed inferior to ratings in 
at-will states. 
B. Data 
The Days Inn chain has 490 hotels situated in good-cause states that were rated 
by guests via Expedia.com. These hotels were rated by a total of 79,060 guests, 
averaging 161 ratings per hotel. Similarly, we located 989 Days Inn hotels in at-will 
states under the same conditions, rated by 139,563 guests via Expedia.com. This 
resulted in an average of 141 ratings per hotel. 
As for the Ramada chain, data gathering was more complex. This chain has three 
different hotel tiers, which differ in price and services offered: Ramada Hotel, 
Ramada Limited Hotel, and Ramada Plaza. The Ramada Hotel tier includes hotels 
for the midmarket traveler. The hotels at this tier are full-service properties with 
swimming pools, exercise rooms, room service, and free breakfast items. Ramada 
Limited Hotels, on the other hand, are budget-oriented properties, typically with no 
on-site restaurant. Finally, Ramada Plazas are full-service hotels, which are 
conveniently located near city centers and/or airports.101 Since each tier at the Ramada 
franchise chain—Ramada Hotel, Ramada Limited Hotel, and Ramada Plaza—has 
different characteristics than the other tiers in the chain, our empirical test on the level 
of franchisee free riding was conducted separately for each of the three tiers. 
For the Ramada Hotel tier, we identified 112 hotels located in good-cause states 
that had been rated by guests via Expedia.com. These hotels were rated by a total of 
39,276 guests, leading to an average of 351 ratings per hotel. In at-will states, 190 
hotels in this tier were rated by 54,115 guests, leading to an average of 285 ratings 
per hotel. At the Ramada Limited Hotel tier, we located 31 hotels in good-cause 
states, rated by 8598 guests and averaging 277 ratings per hotel. At-will states had 
51 such hotels, rated by 8521 guests, for an average of 167 ratings per hotel. Ramada 
Plaza had merely 9 hotels in good-cause states and 11 hotels in at-will states. These 
hotels were rated by 4353 guests and 4381 guests, respectively, averaging 484 and 
398 ratings per hotel. 
Last, for the Super 8 chain, we located 631 hotels in good-cause states, rated by 
69,022 guests, for an average of 109 ratings per hotel. At-will states have 928 such 
hotels, rated by 100,755 guests, for an average of 109 ratings per hotel. Table 1 
summarizes the available data. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See About Ramada, RAMADA WORLDWIDE, http://www.ramada.com/about-us/about
-ramada (last updated 2014). 
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Table 1. Hotel chains in good-cause and at-will states 
 Good-cause states102 At-will states103 
Days Inn   
Number of hotels 490 989 
Number of reviews 79,060 139,563 
Average number of reviews per hotel 161 141 
Ramada Hotel   
Number of hotels 112 190 
Number of reviews 39,276 54,115 
Average number of reviews per hotel 351 285 
Ramada Limited Hotel   
Number of hotels 31 51 
Number of reviews 8598 8521 
Average number of reviews per hotel 277 167 
Ramada Plaza   
Number of hotels 9 11 
Number of reviews 4353 4381 
Average number of reviews per hotel 484 398 
Super 8   
Number of hotels 631 928 
Number of reviews 69,022 100,755 
Average number of reviews per hotel 109 109 
Total hotels 1273 2169 
Total reviews 200,309 307,335 
C. Results 
The folk theorem of GCS literature is that free riding in good-cause states exceeds 
free riding in at-will states due to the disciplinary effect of franchisor termination.104 
We should thus expect customer ratings of difficult-to-quantify variables to be higher 
in at-will states relative to states in which GCSs were enacted. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. These states include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See supra note 4. 
 103. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 104. See supra Part II. 
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In order to test for free riding, we compared customer ratings along several 
dimensions, beginning with average results for each hotel chain and quality tier 
within good-cause versus at-will states. The results show that, on average, ratings for 
all measures are similar across hotels subject to different contractual regulation, 
thereby negating the folk theorem. Initial results are summarized in Table 2, with 
further details and more nuanced investigation thereafter. 
Table 2. Average rating per hotel 
 Good-cause states At-will states 
Days Inn   
Service 3.596 3.615 
Cleanliness 3.543 3.538 
Total satisfaction 3.379 3.399 
Ramada Hotel   
Service 3.796 3.744 
Cleanliness 3.749 3.687 
Total satisfaction 3.581 3.514 
Ramada Limited Hotel   
Service 3.635 3.621 
Cleanliness 3.597 3.596 
Total satisfaction 3.452 3.455 
Ramada Plaza   
Service 3.844 3.864 
Cleanliness 3.867 3.864 
Total satisfaction 3.667 3.709 
Super 8   
Service 3.734 3.685 
Cleanliness 3.705 3.638 
Total satisfaction 3.540 3.482 
Casual observation shows the distribution of ratings in states with a GCS to be 
similar to states without one. Since a good picture is worth a thousand words, below 
we show a graphical boxplot representation of the three categories for Days Inn 
hotels (similar results were obtained for the other chains): 
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Figure 2. Boxplot representation for Days Inn hotels: service 
 
 
Figure 3. Boxplot representation for Days Inn hotels: cleanliness 
 
 
Figure 4. Boxplot representation for Days Inn hotels: total satisfaction 
at will good cause 
at will good cause 
good cause at will 
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While the picture seems clear, appearances might be misleading. In order to verify 
that our results indeed show GCSs have little effect on perceived quality, we 
employed a variety of econometric methods designed to tease out any differences 
that might escape initial detection. Since our purpose was to determine whether the 
at-will sample outperforms good-cause hotels, we tested the data using a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test (also known as the Mann-Whitney U test), which examines two given 
samples to determine whether one is drawn from a population with higher variables.105 
If the folk theorem is correct, as the law-and-economics literature suggests, we would 
be able to reject the null hypothesis that the populations are identical. 
Across the five samples (Days Inn, Ramada Hotel, Ramada Limited Hotel, Ramada 
Plaza, Super 8) and the three parameters examined (service, cleanliness, overall 
satisfaction), in no case did the statistical test return a value showing any advantage to 
at-will states over good-cause ones. Thus, in fifteen separate analyses, examining a 
total of 200,309 reviews in good-cause states versus a total of 307,335 reviews in 
at-will states, not one stratum returned a result lending credence to the prevailing 
wisdom that GCSs increase free riding.106 The results therefore cast considerable doubt 
on the validity of the traditional law-and-economics analysis of GCSs. 
After assessing average ratings in the three categories and failing to find 
differences between at-will and good-cause states, we decided to investigate further. 
In order to rule out the possibility of skewed results due to some peculiarity of the 
online ranking method, we reassessed each of the fifteen tests (five hotel chains, three 
qualities that proxy for free riding) by further stratifying according to rating levels. 
Thus, we disentangled the online ratings according to low-to-high strata rather than 
focusing on average results. This allowed us to examine whether some rating levels 
were more sensitive to differences among populations, differences that might escape 
detection if averaged out by opposite biases in different rating levels. For example, 
it might be that more significantly low ratings were given to hotels in good-cause 
states than at-will states, even if the average ratings were similar due to an opposite 
bias affecting high ratings. 
In order to assess this possibility, we separated each of the fifteen strata into 
groups, ranking low to high ratings according to the numerical scale used by Expedia. 
Thus, we compared ratings in each group to similar ratings in the other group rather 
than aggregating within group averages. We then applied a chi-square test and a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See H. B. Mann & D. R. Whitney, On a Test of Whether One of Two Random 
Variables Is Stochastically Larger Than the Other, 18 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 50 
(1947); Frank Wilcoxon, Individual Comparisons by Ranking Methods, 1 BIOMETRICS BULL. 
80 (1945). This test was warranted due to the populations of ratings not being distributed 
normally. On a scale of 1 to 5, 1s are almost unheard of, while 5s are prevalent. The tails are 
thus heavy and nonsymmetric. We therefore used a nonparametric test so as to avoid 
unwarranted assumptions that might skew the results. 
 106. In order to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions are equal, the two-sided 
Wilcoxon test must return a value below 5% or 1% (0.05 or 0.01), depending on the 
significance criterion chosen. Actual results ranged between 28% and 97%, thus suggesting 
(strongly) that the distributions are similar and GCSs have no effect on customer ratings. 
Indeed, in one case, the result was opposite that predicted by the standard explanation. In the 
case of Super 8 hotels, we were unable to reject a hypothesis that good-cause states had higher 
ratings than at-will states, though only at the 5%, rather than 1%, level. 
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Fisher’s exact test,107 but we again failed to find any statistically significant 
difference among states along any of the dimensions examined. Below is a sample 
table showing the distribution and analysis of ratings for total satisfaction at Days 
Inn hotels (all other tables are available upon request and show similar results): 
Table 3. Distribution and analysis of ratings for total satisfaction at Days Inn hotels108 
Frequency, %, Row %, Col % Low Middle High Total 
At-will states 
195 
13.18 
19.72 
66.33 
643 
43.48 
65.02 
66.02 
151 
10.21 
15.27 
71.56 
989 
66.87 
Good-cause states 
99 
6.69 
20.20 
33.67 
331 
22.38 
67.55 
33.98 
60 
4.06 
12.24 
28.44 
490 
33.13 
Total 294 
19.88 
974 
65.86 
211 
14.27 
1479 
100.00 
Statistic DF Value Probability 
Chi-square 2 2.4580 0.2926 
Likelihood ratio chi-square 2 2.5123 0.2848 
Mantel-Haenszel chi-square 1 0.9410 0.3320 
Phi coefficient  0.0408  
Contingency coefficient  0.0407  
Cramer’s V  0.0408  
Fisher’s exact test  
Table probability (P) 0.0010 
Pr <= P 0.2970 
Note: sample size = 1479 
We can thus safely say that not only are average ratings per hotel similar in good-
cause and at-will states, but there is no statistically significant difference among any 
group of reviewers at any level of satisfaction. Therefore, it is safe to say that 
good-cause statutes do not diminish customer satisfaction along any dimension 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Both tests are used to examine whether the results measured differ significantly from 
the results expected under the null hypothesis—that is, whether reality differs from 
expectations. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 104–06 (5th ed. 2003). In 
this case, they allow for examining whether the differences between states are random 
fluctuations or whether they stem from the existence of GCSs in some states and not in others. 
It turned out that GCSs had no statistically significant effect on customer reviews.  
 108. For each rubric in the table, four quantities are reported: Frequency (the number of 
occurrences in the data); % (the percentage of the population falling within this rubric); Row 
% (the percentage of the row population, for example, at-will states, falling within this rubric); 
and Col % (the percentage of the column population, for example, low satisfaction, falling 
within this rubric). 
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measured. Since ratings for cleanliness, service, and overall satisfaction were 
presumed to proxy for quality differences associated with free riding, there appears 
to be no support in our data for the folk theorem that good-cause statutes induce free 
riding and impede franchisor control of on-site quality. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
The conventional law-and-economics analysis of GCSs contends that they 
increase franchisee free riding.109 This analysis rests on one central assumption: an 
essential control mechanism against franchisee free riding is the ability of the 
franchisor to terminate the franchise contract at will.110 The results of our empirical 
tests show that the traditional economic approach is questionable. Specifically, these 
tests demonstrate that the level of free riding in good-cause states, which prohibit at-
will termination, is similar to the level of free riding in at-will states. 
Several explanations might be offered for this phenomenon. One might argue that 
the result applies to hotels but not to other industries. Of course, then one would have 
to supply corroboration and a convincing explanation of why hotels are different. 
Even if such a claim was considered, the hotel industry is sufficiently large to warrant 
consideration in and of itself. Furthermore, most discussions of free riding in the 
franchise industry focus on travel hotels as the paradigmatic case of nonrepeat 
customers, relying on free riding to justify contractual mechanisms and regulatory 
noninterference more generally. Even if our results do not generally extend to other 
related industries, normative issues arise within the hotel industry itself, and these 
will be discussed below. 
Before we move on to our preferred interpretation of the results, it is important to 
rule out several factors that, if present, would limit any conclusions drawn. It might be, 
for instance, that the presence of GCSs does not increase free riding because contractual 
terms in good-cause states override the effective protection of such statutes. However, 
this hypothesis is ruled out by the mandatory nature of most GCSs, negating any 
contractual waiver of the rights. Thus, a franchisee who agreed to a contract stipulating 
at-will termination in a good-cause state would still be protected and could bring suit 
based on the GCS regardless of contractual language to the contrary.111 
It might also be that the opposite is true—that national franchises include 
good-cause language in all their contracts, obviating at-will termination by 
contractually conceding the case and essentially implementing GCS-like protection 
even in at-will states. But such a claim is wrong on two counts: First, the facts are 
different. Examination of the contracts shows that most include at-will termination 
clauses or other clauses that do not satisfy the statutory good-cause requirement.112 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. See supra Part II.C. 
 110. See supra Part II.B. 
 111. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 112. For example, according to the Days Inns and Super 8 franchise contracts, the franchisor 
may terminate the agreement for convenience at any time upon six months’ advance notice. See 
DAYS INN WORLDWIDE, INC., FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT 9 (2013), available at https://
www.cards.commerce.state.mn.us/CARDS/security/search.do?method=showPoup&documentId
={D01E9B8F-E1F5-4937-B901-7079A48A50BA}&documentTitle=42280&documentType=4; 
SUPER 8, FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT 9 (2013), available at https://www.cards.commerce
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Second, if all franchise contracts included good-cause language, there would be no 
effective at-will states, making franchisor resistance to good-cause statutes 
unnecessary. Since such resistance is strong, there must be a reason franchisors view 
GCSs as problematic.113 We will return to this issue below, when discussing normative 
recommendations. 
In our opinion, the most appropriate interpretation of the results described above 
relates to the means used to obtain them, namely the review sites from which we 
drew our empirical data. Such review sites—namely, websites that allow customers 
to post reviews about franchisees—are prevalent and widely used, and they serve a 
primary purpose of allowing customers to give feedback regarding the business they 
interacted with. Such feedback is directly aimed at the specific venue, but probably 
more intended for the indirect communication with other customers considering the 
same provider. For reasons detailed below, online review sites facilitate quality 
control within franchise chains, as free riding will be directly disciplined by negative 
customer ratings that reduce future business of potential customers. The Expedia 
rating system allows all potential customers to incorporate observed results in their 
decision whether to use the reviewed business’s offerings or to pursue a better 
alternative. In other words, where online ratings are sufficiently trustworthy, 
franchisors can rely on customer participation in monitoring wayward franchisees. 
Such a system thus supplants at-will termination as a quality-control mechanism, 
making the statutory differences between states with and without GCSs less 
important. Ultimately, a successful online review system forces individual 
franchisees to conform to expected quality levels, making the once-indispensable 
at-will mechanism obsolete. 
A. The Role of Review Sites 
Online review sites force the free-riding franchisee to bear the costs of his or her 
shirking, as even first-time visitors have the benefit of information regarding venue 
quality. Since shirking on difficult-to-quantify investment in quality is policed by 
customers, it need not be policed to the same extent as previously required by 
franchisors. Thus, traditional explanations regarding GCSs inducing free riding 
might have been true before, but it seems that online reputation mechanisms have 
supplanted threats of contractual termination. Of course, our study does nothing to 
corroborate (and nothing to dispute) the traditional explanations’ efficacy prior to the 
advent of online rankings, and not all industries operate with such reputation 
                                                                                                                 
 
.state.mn.us/CARDS/security/search.do?method=showPoup&documentId={4DCCC980-68EE
-488C-9DA8-12B151322F53}&documentTitle=41631&documentType=4; see also Jonathan 
Klick, Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of 
Franchising 8 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07–03, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464 (“[M]ost franchise contracts contain at will 
termination clauses.”). 
 113. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 372 (“Franchisors argue that the threat of arbitrary 
termination is the only means by which they can protect themselves from franchisees engaging 
in potentially opprobrious behavior.”); Hess, supra note 1, at 342 (“Franchisors claim a need 
for an unrestricted termination power to protect the value of their trademark and to insure a 
uniform standard of quality among all franchises.”). 
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mechanisms. Still, given that Expedia is but one of many review websites and that 
social media networks such as Facebook make online reputations the rule rather than 
the exception, these findings are significant.114 
In the hotel industry, the focus of our empirical study, online review sites have 
become a widespread phenomenon. Sites such as Expedia, TripAdvisor, and Orbitz 
allow travelers to write reviews and rate the hotels in which they have stayed. 
Empirical studies show that online hotel reviews written by travelers influence 
travelers’ booking decisions. For example, Ulrike Gretzel, Kyung Hyan Yoo, and 
Melanie Purifoy conducted a survey among 7000 TripAdvisor.com users in order to 
examine several factors, including the impact of travel reviews on travelers’ 
trip-planning processes.115 According to the survey, 91.8% of respondents avoided 
places or services due to the content of online reviews posted by other travelers.116 
Similarly, an experimental study conducted by Aurelio Mauri and Roberta Minazzi 
tested, among other things, whether travelers consult comments of other travelers 
before booking a hotel.117 The experiment shows that respondents’ hotel booking 
intentions indeed increased where there was a prevalence of positive comments and 
decreased in the face of negative ones.118 Other studies produced similar results.119 
Empirical studies reveal more than the mere influence of reviews on booking 
decisions; they also demonstrate that hotel revenues are significantly impacted.120 In 
one study by Chris K. Anderson, a 1% increase in online reputation measures led to 
a 0.54% increase in occupancy and a 1.42% increase in hotel revenues.121 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See Courtney Christman, Reputation Management Through Social Media and 
Online Reviews, MAINSTREETHOST (Mar. 3, 2014), http://blog.mainstreethost.com/reputation
-management-social-media-online-reviews#.VODAnPnF98E. 
 115. ULRIKE GRETZEL, KYUNG HYAN YOO & MELANIE PURIFOY, ONLINE TRAVEL REVIEW 
STUDY: ROLE & IMPACT OF ONLINE TRAVEL REVIEWS 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.tripadvisor.com/pdfs/OnlineTravelReviewReport.pdf. 
 116. Id. at 25. 
 117. Aurelio G. Mauri & Roberta Minazzi, Web Reviews Influence on Expectations and 
Purchasing Intentions of Hotel Potential Customers, INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT., Sept. 
2013, at 99. 
 118. Id. at 102–04. 
 119. See, e.g., Beverley A. Sparks & Victoria Browning, The Impact of Online Reviews on Hotel 
Booking Intentions and Perception of Trust, 32 TOURISM MGMT. 1310 (2011); Qiang Ye, Rob Law, 
Bin Gu & Wei Chen, The Influence of User-Generated Content on Traveler Behavior: An Empirical 
Investigation on the Effects of E-Word-of-Mouth to Hotel Online Bookings, 27 COMPUTERS HUM. 
BEHAV. 634 (2011); Online Consumer-Generated Reviews Have Significant Impact on Offline 
Purchase Behavior, COMSCORE (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press
_Releases/2007/11/Online_Consumer_Reviews_Impact_Offline_Purchasing_Behavior. 
 120. Cf. Qiang Ye, Rob Law & Bin Gu, The Impact of Online User Reviews on Hotel Room 
Sales, 28 INT’L J. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 180 (2009) (showing that a 10% improvement in travel 
review ratings increased online bookings by 4.4%). 
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B. Normative Implications 
Given that online review sites dramatically impact hotel revenues, franchisors in 
the hotel industry need no longer rely on the at-will termination mechanism to 
discipline their franchisees. Customers, assisted by online review sites and the 
lowered transaction costs of obtaining and disseminating information, are able to 
directly punish hotels who free ride on chain reputations and provide subpar service. 
Online review sites are not alone in supplanting at-will termination in franchise 
contracts. Adam Badawi has shown that informal mechanisms operate alongside 
formal ones and that at-will termination is far from the only way to make franchisees 
conform to quality standards.122 In the classic carrot-and-stick terminology, where the 
“stick” of contractual termination is difficult to effectuate, a “carrot” emerges—such 
as using promises of additional franchises to incentivize investment in quality. In his 
study, Badawi focuses on liquidated damages, which streamline contractual 
enforcement and operate similarly to the type of at-will termination we study here—
but he finds that the use of liquidated damages is limited and negatively correlated with 
informal mechanisms.123 In other words, “carrots” might be preferable to “sticks,” 
especially where customers can punish franchisees directly.124 Where online review 
sites operate effectively, the marketplace wields the “stick,” making courts and formal 
proceedings dispensable. Since formal and informal mechanisms are viewed as 
substitutes, franchisors would do well to avail themselves of positive reinforcements—
such as promising future business growth and additional franchise opportunities—
while leaving punishment to anonymous customers who post negative reviews online. 
The question remains: To what extent do online review sites discipline businesses 
beyond the hotel industry and beyond franchise operations? To the extent that the 
data assessed above is representative of other industries, we should expect quality to 
be maintained due to fear of negative reprisals—not by the franchisor or organized 
groups but by the free flow of information attributable to modern-day Internet usage. 
We focused on Expedia.com due to the nature of its control over review procedures, 
but one could think of expanding the purview to almost any industry in which 
customers exchange information online. For “old school” professors like us, the way 
Expedia restricts ratings to paying customers inspires faith in the results. Still, one 
might imagine that in the era of Facebook and near-constant and universal online 
discussion, reviews may very well be a dependable source of incentives for provision 
of quality even in the face of incomplete contracts and unverifiable information. 
While we focused on franchise operations and the role of good-cause statutes, the 
insight gained goes further. Where the online world provides for customer 
interaction, exploitation of nonrepeat customers may be a losing prospect. When 
information is freely available and customer dissatisfaction can be conveyed online, 
businesses of all sorts need to adapt to a world in which the one-shot consumer is a 
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disappearing species. The fear that good-cause statutes impede franchise operations 
and induce free riding is thus overstated, especially in the online world. 
Still, franchisor groups are notoriously opposed to GCSs, and attempts to enact such 
statutes are usually stifled.125 If our conclusions are correct, what would explain this 
attitude? First, opposition to GCSs might be a path-dependent result, explained more 
by what was once true than what is relevant today. If at-will termination once operated 
as an important factor constraining free riding, past resistance to GCSs is understandable. 
Given that most public debates on the matter predate effective review sites being widely 
available, we might be seeing the lasting impression of a dying world. 
Second, it may be that at-will termination is still important in industries in which 
review sites are unavailable or ineffective. Hotels, together with the rest of the travel 
industry, are at the forefront of the online revolution, and it may be that results obtained 
here are not universally applicable. While this may be the case, it merits investigation 
into which other industries are characterized by effective online review, whether via 
official sites devoted to the matter or via alternative means such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and other widely available social media. It stands to reason that online review is a 
growing industry, regardless of the form it takes, given that an ever-growing percentage 
of the population is spending an ever-growing percentage of its time conversing with 
others and offering opinions on almost everything under the sun.126 
Third, the simplest explanation might be the truest—that franchisors oppose 
GCSs since these statutes impede not just contractual monitoring but also 
franchisors’ abilities to exploit the franchisees within their networks. Franchisor 
opportunism was described above as consisting of three related behaviors: raising 
fees and requiring additional purchases, revoking licenses in order to resell them to 
new franchisees at higher prices, and revoking licenses in order to repossess the site 
and run it as a company-owned franchise.127 At-will contracting is less necessary 
today (in specific industries) than it formerly was, from the perspective of 
constraining franchisee opportunism (i.e., free riding on the brand), but it retains its 
power as a forcing mechanism. Proponents of GCSs thus have another weapon in 
their rhetorical arsenal when arguing for enactment: franchises manage to maintain 
equivalent quality with or without GCSs. If there are distributional reasons to prefer 
protection of the weaker party, and if franchisees are assumed to have less bargaining 
power, GCSs might very well be the answer. 
Of course, the result we show is too narrow to support an argument for GCSs as a 
whole. Some industries can rely on review sites; others cannot. One might consider 
tailoring the law to specific industries based on the effectiveness of online reviews, 
while others might argue that this approach is too regulation intensive and that simple 
“yes or no” answers work better. In any case, one argument can no longer be made—
that at-will contracting is indispensable and that “franchisee protection laws increase 
shirking and free-riding.”128 The customers of the hotels in our sample suggest otherwise. 
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CONCLUSION 
Franchisee free riding lies at the center of the debate over the appropriateness of 
GCSs. The traditional law-and-economics analysis distinguishes between industries 
with repeat customers, in which the risk of franchisee free riding is low, and 
industries with nonrepeat customers, in which the risk of franchisee free riding is 
high. In these latter industries, GCSs are argued to be inefficient, as they are likely 
to increase the level of free riding.129 
In this Article, we empirically investigated the conventional economic analysis of 
GCSs. We did so by attempting a direct comparison between the levels of franchisee 
free riding in good-cause and at-will states. Online hotel reviews written by guests 
allowed us to measure franchisee free riding with reasonable precision. Examining a 
sample of three hotel chains—Days Inn, Ramada, and Super 8—we found no 
significant differences in the level of free riding in good-cause states versus at-will 
states in any of these chains. These results question the validity of the conventional 
economic analysis of GCSs. 
One potential explanation that we have provided for these results is that although 
GCSs may curtail the at-will control mechanism against franchisee free riding, there is 
a substitute, market-based control mechanism in place: online review sites. Franchisee 
free riding is constrained not by an at-will contract but by the fear of negative consumer 
reviews, which ultimately may dramatically reduce a franchisee’s revenues. 
Although our empirical analysis focuses on the hotel industry, our results may 
apply to other industries with nonrepeat consumers. We predict that normally, in 
industries with effective online review sites and those in which consumer interaction 
exists via social media, the at-will control mechanism will not prove an essential 
control mechanism against franchisee free riding. Negative reviews by consumers 
may serve as an adequate substitute for at-will contracts. As a result, good-cause 
statutes, which prevent the at-will termination of the contract, are not likely to 
increase the level of franchisee free riding in those industries. Since the same GCSs 
offer the benefit of reducing the converse fear—of franchisor opportunism—their 
enactment may very well increase aggregate welfare while protecting what are 
usually small-business owners from large-chain operations. 
Our results call for a novel subdistinction, overlooked so far in the debate over 
GCSs. Industries with nonrepeat customers should be divided into two major groups: 
those subject to effective consumer interaction via social media (including, but not 
limited to, effective online review sites), in which the risk of free riding is relatively 
low; and those without such consumer interaction, in which the risk of free riding 
may be higher. Within the first group, the necessity of an at-will contract as a control 
mechanism against free riding is questionable. This conclusion opens the door for 
reconsideration of the adoption of GCSs, even in industries with nonrepeat 
customers, as appropriate mechanisms for limiting franchisor opportunism and 
protecting individual franchisees from unequal bargaining terms. 
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